The IDF’s investigations into the breakdown of security on October 7th, released on Thursday evening, reveal the flaws in the strategy that failed to prevent the devastating events of that morning at 6:29 a.m. Over the years, the Israeli Defense Forces and the broader defense community developed a strategy based on false assumptions, which allowed Hamas to methodically construct a system capable of executing the surprise attack. These investigations show that the errors began well before October 7th, 2023, tracing back to the period following Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
The report outlines how Yahya Sinwar, who became the leader of Hamas in 2017, led a dramatic shift in strategy from an emphasis on underground tactics to large-scale ground assaults. Meanwhile, Israel’s defense establishment remained “stuck” in outdated strategies. It was revealed that for years, Israel’s security outlook toward Gaza was underpinned by a single major assumption: that Hamas was a rational entity that could be “deterred and adheres to the arrangement.” Even after Sinwar’s ascent to leadership in 2017, Israeli intelligence continued to regard Hamas as a “rational organization” primarily focused on “quiet” in Gaza to facilitate civil progress. The inquiry discovered that “there was a series of misconceptions throughout the year.”
The report also found that the threat from Gaza was not deemed to be the most pressing one. After Operation Protective Edge, Hamas had established a more structured leadership with an “operational headquarters” overseen by Ra’ed Sa’ad. Under his direction, Hamas began formulating a large-scale operation – a massive assault on Israel that involved a ground invasion by thousands of militants. However, even as these plans took shape, Israeli intelligence continued to assess that Hamas was primarily focused on constructing tunnels.
The investigation further revealed that Israel’s strategic outlook had been significantly influenced by the events of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021. While Hamas viewed the operation as a “victory” due to successful rocket attacks on Jerusalem and the realization that it could engage in a multi-front war with Israel, including with Hezbollah, Israel believed it had achieved “deterrence” and claimed that it had significantly damaged Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure.
A particularly troubling finding of the investigation was the “Wall of Jericho” document, which outlines Hamas’s strategy for an attack. The document, obtained by Israel in 2022, clearly detailed Hamas’s intention to overwhelm the Gaza Division’s defenses with 4,000 terrorists and advance into Israeli cities. Despite its specificity, the plan was dismissed as a “future idea” aimed at building up forces, rather than an immediate threat. The document was shown to the IDF Intelligence Directorate Chief and the Commander of the Southern Command in May 2022, but it was unclear whether it represented a concrete plan or was merely conceptual planning by Ra’ed Sa’ad.
In November 2022, during a “Profile of a War” session, the military discussed the “Wall of Jericho” as a potential future scenario. At the time, the assumption was that Hamas could launch an invasion with just two companies and around 70 terrorists. However, on October 7th, approximately 5,600 terrorists participated in the attack, exposing a major underestimation of Hamas’s capabilities.
Another significant failure highlighted by the investigation was the diversion of resources to other fronts, primarily Judea and Samaria and the northern front, which weakened Gaza’s defense. Additionally, there was a misplaced reliance on the barrier along the Gaza-Israel border, which had been completed in 2021. The barrier was not designed to defend against a large-scale, surprise assault. It was intended to help manage massive demonstrations and limit smaller infiltrations. Nonetheless, Israel developed an overconfidence in its effectiveness, which led to a reduced military presence due to resource constraints.
Finally, the IDF investigations revealed how Hamas effectively misled Israel through sophisticated deception. Israeli officials believe that Hamas engaged in a “deception effort,” carefully avoiding actions that could escalate tensions with Israel and potentially disrupt its broader attack strategy.
{Matzav.com Israel}