The recordings of a discussion between IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Southern Command’s Yaron Finkelman, and local leaders from southern Israel, which were aired by Amit Segal on Channel 12, reveal startling new details regarding the significant breakdowns that occurred the night before the devastating Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.
At 8:00 p.m. on the eve of the assault, following the activation of SIM cards intended for use in the attack and the failure to appropriately address the warnings which got buried in a pile of military emails, the Gaza Division became aware that six commanders from Hamas’s elite Nukhba Force were missing. Despite efforts to track them down, only one of the commanders was located, and the search for the remaining five was abandoned, with the group already en route to the locations where they would launch their assault just hours later.
Around 2:00 a.m., phone traffic within the Gaza Strip surged dramatically. The assistant to the head of the Palestinian desk in IDF intelligence attempted to reach her supervisor, but due to communication failures, he was only roused from sleep four hours later.
Here lies a critical intelligence failure. The intelligence officer on duty in the Gaza Division lacked the necessary clearance to access key information, which had been shared through WhatsApp rather than official military channels.
Adding to this is the fact that at 4:35 a.m. and 5:35 a.m., the Air Force received vital intelligence, yet this was not disseminated to the rest of the military. The Air Force, unaware of the other warning signs, failed to recognize the need to communicate this intelligence, leaving the broader picture incomplete and disconnected.
As for the Director of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, his chief of staff, who asserted that the director should not be disturbed while on vacation, sent him a WhatsApp message at 12:40 a.m. After receiving more critical information at 2:50 a.m., he called Intelligence Director Aharon Haliva, who inquired whether Southern Command was addressing the issue. Haliva then returned to sleep until 6:29 a.m.
Further investigations revealed that for the fifteen years leading up to the attack, the Intelligence Directorate lacked a human source within Gaza, and the ISA also did not have an active informant in the area at the time.
Amid all this confusion, orders that were issued went unheeded. The Chief of Staff had instructed intelligence gathering operations to be carried out, but his command was ignored. Similarly, the Southern Command’s chief instructed preparations for a Gaza raid, but essentially no action was taken.
{Matzav.com}