In its report released unexpectedly on Tuesday, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) assumed considerable responsibility for the tragic events of October 7. The agency, while outlining its own failures, also subtly pointed to Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, suggesting that his policies on the Har Habayis, the treatment of Palestinian detainees, and the judicial reform contributed to Hamas’s decision to execute its long-awaited invasion.
Though Netanyahu’s name was not directly mentioned, the report indicated that these were policies enacted by his government. Some, such as those concerning the Har Habayis and Palestinian detainees, were driven by then-national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, yet Netanyahu, as the prime minister, allowed them to continue, even though he had the authority to intervene.
Ben-Gvir significantly increased the number of Jewish visitors to the Har Habayis compared to previous years. He disregarded certain restrictions on activities there, openly called for a radical shift in the “status quo” of the site, and adopted measures that worsened the treatment of Palestinian detainees.
These actions led to harsh criticisms from moderate Sunni Arab allies, the Western world, and Hamas, alongside private cautions from the Shin Bet.
Other controversial policies under Netanyahu’s leadership, flagged by the Shin Bet, included his facilitation of Qatari funds to Hamas and his opposition to proposed targeted killings of top Hamas figures at the time.
The judicial reform, also a Netanyahu-driven initiative, was seen by many as a critical factor. While critics could place the blame on the prime minister for pushing this legislation, Netanyahu could counter that the backlash against the reform had a direct impact on the readiness of the IDF and on Hamas’s assessment of the army’s strength.
A significant portion of the report highlighted the Shin Bet’s internal failings. While it was instituting reforms to address its catastrophic errors of October 7, the agency acknowledged that these steps would not be enough to avert future calamities unless there were substantial changes in the coordination between the political leadership and defense sectors.
The report primarily focused on the shortcomings of the Shin Bet. It had failed to predict the invasion, misjudged Hamas’s intentions both before and on the day of October 7, did not adapt to Hamas’s growing military capabilities, and neglected to assess the erosion of Israeli deterrence effectively.
One of the agency’s significant blind spots was its belief, on the eve of October 7, that Hamas was likely focused on an operation in the West Bank, especially after the group had carried out an unusual terrorist attack there on October 5.
The Shin Bet’s strategy, though logically sound in some respects, was hindered by an overreliance on the IDF’s high-tech border fence, a preference for maintaining stability and quiet, and a fear of provoking Hamas to such an extent that it might trigger instability or an unnecessary war—similar to the 2014 conflict.
{Matzav.com Israel}