The IDF on Thursday released the results of its in-depth probe into how security forces responded during the massacre at the Supernova Music Festival, held near Re’im, on October 7, 2023.
The horrific attack, in which 378 people—including civilians, security personnel, and festival staff—were slaughtered and 44 others were kidnapped (11 of whom were later murdered in captivity), revealed widespread shortcomings within the military, particularly within the Gaza Division and its Northern Brigade.
The investigation commended Chief Superintendent Nivi Ohana, commander of the Ofakim Police Station, for making a swift call to shut down the festival as rocket fire began at 6:29 a.m. According to the findings, this prompt action likely saved thousands of lives and prevented an even greater catastrophe.
One of the more unexpected conclusions from the report was that the festival itself was not an original target for Hamas. The terrorists, who had intended to reach Netivot, mistakenly arrived at the Re’im area after taking a wrong turn at the Shokeda Junction—bringing them directly to the site of the large gathering.
Hamas’s invasion strategy began with a massive rocket barrage of around 5,000 missiles, intended to overwhelm defenses and enable 1,200 terrorists to breach Israeli territory, take control of key positions around the Gaza border, and then proceed to murder residents in nearby communities. Most of the Supernova victims lost their lives while attempting to escape and were ambushed in different locations along the way.
At the time of the onslaught, roughly 3,500 individuals were present at the festival site, including event staff, security teams, and police officers. The most lethal attack zones included the main festival grounds and its adjacent parking lots, a curve in the road near Mifalsim, the intersection and entrance to Kibbutz Re’im, Gama Junction, the Be’eri area, the surroundings of Alumim, and Route 232.
The review also addressed how the event received official authorization. Investigators noted that the organizers had properly followed procedures to obtain a permit. While IDF personnel were absent from police planning meetings, the army had initially approved the festival concept, and a Home Front Command officer even visited the site ahead of a second planned event. The Northern Brigade commander had initially rejected the permit due to concerns about troop deployment for security, but after deliberation with the Gaza Division, the permit was granted—aligned with the IDF’s policy of maintaining routine civilian life in the Gaza border region.
The report’s harshest criticism focused on how the Northern Brigade, led by Col. Cohen, and the Gaza Division handled the situation. “There was no security coordination between the festival and the military activity in the area,” the findings stated. Additional failures included not assigning a military liaison to the festival’s police control center, no on-site inspections by commanding officers, and a lack of military forces deployed to guard the event.
Alongside detailed descriptions of the massacre and systemic failings, the report also documented individual acts of bravery. Though the festival was quickly disbanded following the police commander’s alert, terrorists managed to access critical locations and fire on people trying to escape. At one point, a report from the Home Front Command to the Northern Brigade’s operations room incorrectly indicated that most terrorists had already withdrawn from the area, leading the military to divert its attention. The investigation also flagged a miscalculation by an IDF attack helicopter pilot who failed to engage a group of terrorists because their identity could not be confirmed.
A group of approximately 100 Hamas Nukhba fighters arrived at the festival around 8:10 a.m., having lost their way en route to Netivot. Armed with heavy weaponry, they continued the slaughter, killing an additional 171 people—including the wounded, event staff, and police. It wasn’t until 11:30 a.m. that a small team of Givati Brigade soldiers and Israel Prison Service officers, guided by a soldier on leave, arrived and succeeded in neutralizing 15 terrorists. The area wasn’t fully secured and cleared of attackers until 3:00 a.m. the next morning.
The investigation concluded that both the Northern Brigade and the Gaza Division lacked a real-time understanding of the unfolding tragedy at the festival. No communication was established with the police, and the military made no significant effort to gather accurate information. The General Staff’s Operations Division only received a first report of the incident at 10:00 a.m., several hours into the attack. A host of critical failures across the Northern Brigade, Gaza Division, and Southern Command were cited as factors that contributed to the inability to prevent or mitigate the bloodshed.
Key deficiencies highlighted included poor planning regarding the location and potential vulnerabilities of the event, the absence of a formal threat assessment ahead of the massive gathering, limited awareness among military personnel about the festival and its scale, a complete breakdown in coordination between the army and civilian authorities, the failure to designate the festival as a sensitive site requiring extra protection, and the lack of a proper alert system for incoming rocket fire.
{Matzav.com Israel}