By Alex Traiman
On Sunday, Israel and Hamas entered into a temporary ceasefire, 470 days after the horrific Oct. 7 massacre in which Hamas murdered some 1,200 Israelis, kidnapped over 250 and injured thousands more. A bitter 15-month war ensued, leaving tens of thousands dead and much of Gaza in ruins.
Phase 1 of the deal will see 33 of the remaining 97 hostages (who include 10 non-Israelis—eight from Thailand, one from Nepal and one from Tanzania) released by Hamas, most of whom are supposedly alive, over a period of six weeks. In exchange, Israel will release 1,000 Gazan prisoners of war—many of them arrested for this specific purpose—and more than 700 convicted Palestinian terrorists serving terms in Israeli jails. Many of the terrorists are first-degree murderers with blood on their hands.
Israel with withdraw from population centers in Gaza, allowing residents to return to their homes—if they are still standing.
Phases 2 and 3 of the deal have yet to be negotiated. Those phases would potentially return all of the remaining hostages, including those no longer living, and put a permanent end to the Israel-Hamas component of a wider war between Israel and Iran’s network of terror proxies.
Negotiating with terrorists

The very thought of negotiating with terrorists represents a strategic disaster. Hamas’s purpose in taking the captives was to hold all of Israel hostage until it would end its offensive on Gaza. That Israel would negotiate with terrorists represents a failure to alter the paradigm of hostage taking. Giving back 1,700 Palestinian prisoners to get back fewer than three dozen hostages will teach terrorists across the Middle East, and the world over, that taking hostages is a strategy that works.

 
By negotiating, Hamas has gotten exactly what it hoped for. And Israel should expect that Hamas, Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, or Yerushalayim, or Hezbollah in Lebanon, may try taking hostages in the near future. The only way to deter terror organizations from taking hostages is to make the price of taking them too difficult to bear.
Rescuing the hostages didn’t work
Sadly, IDF operations to rescue the hostages did not yield the desired results. Through military operations, Israel was able to rescue only eight hostages. On another occasion, hostages who managed to break free from their captors were inadvertently killed by IDF soldiers in the heat of battle. Unconfirmed Hamas claims allege that other hostages were killed by Israeli airstrikes. At another point, Hamas captors killed their hostages when IDF troops seemed to be closing in on their whereabouts.
The fate of hostages was a major consideration guiding whether or not the IDF would move into areas where they were believed to be held. Meanwhile, a temporary ceasefire agreement barely seven weeks into the war saw 105 hostages released in November 2023, demonstrating that negotiation, while not preferred, was the most successful method of bringing hostages back.
As a consequence, perhaps the current ceasefire/hostage-exchange deal was one that Prime Minister Binyomin Netanyahu felt he had to accept. Aside from the long-awaited return of the first 33 of the remaining hostages, entering into the deal may have silver linings in the form of side understandings that may or may not become apparent in the weeks ahead.
‘All hell to pay’
A “breakthrough” in negotiations was reached after incoming President Donald Trump insisted that there would be “all hell to pay” if the hostages were not released prior to his inauguration. Trump sent his Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff to Israel last weekend to pressure Netanyahu, presumably with a package of both carrots and sticks, to reach an agreement with Hamas.
Witkoff—apparently with Trump’s backing—called Netanyahu’s months-long bluff. Earlier in the war, with the Biden administration threatening to cut off key weapons and munitions supplies and remove American support for Israel at the United Nations, Netanyahu needed to demonstrate that he was the party willing to move toward a ceasefire, while Hamas remained intransigent. When the Biden administration presented a similar framework for a hostage-prisoner exchange back in May, Netanyahu took the risk that Hamas would reject the terms—which it did.
Hamas’s rejection was key in buying Netanyahu more credit in Washington to continue advancing Israel’s military campaign. By doing so, the IDF created the conditions and leverage that—when backed by incoming President Trump’s threats—forced Hamas’s hand ahead of the inauguration.
‘Temporary ceasefire’
Hamas suddenly backed off key demands that had prevented it from accepting the Biden administration’s earlier versions of a ceasefire/exchange deal. Previously, Hamas had demanded a permanent ceasefire before releasing any hostages. Second, Hamas had demanded that Israel relinquish control of the Philadelphi Corridor—the border between Gaza and Egypt—a smuggling route critical to the rearmament of Hamas.
Yet with Hamas suddenly on board to accept the prisoner exchange framework, within the framework of a “temporary ceasefire” agreement, Witkoff then pressed Netanyahu to agree to the terms he “accepted” back in May.
So much for surrender
Israel had always hoped that the hostage release would come as part of a surrender deal. The hostages would come home in return for the release of prisoners of war, plus the surrender and exile of Hamas leaders including Yahya Sinwar. Sinwar was killed in October, following the killings of several other senior terrorist leaders.
On Sunday, Israelis welcomed the first three of their long-lost hostages home with celebratory open arms, but that doesn’t mean Israelis are celebrating the deal. On the face of it—33 hostages out of 97 in captivity, in return for more than 1,700 security prisoners, many of whom have blood on their hands and will likely return to terror activity, plus Israeli withdrawals from areas that will soon be retaken by Hamas—this is a heavily lopsided deal.
Even if Hamas makes good on its obligation to return the 33 hostages—again, including the living and the dead—male hostages under the age of 50 are not included in the deal. In other words, even with the return of some captives, there will still be a hostage crisis if phases 2 and 3 of the deal are not successfully negotiated.
Psychological terrorism
The 33 hostages set for release will be sent home in small batches over a period of six weeks. Further, it is not known how many of the 33 are alive. Netanyahu, in his first public address since reaching the phase 1 agreement, told Israelis that it is believed that “most” of the hostages are alive. It is not known what percentage this “most” constitutes.
Throughout the war, Hamas has released videos of hostages making scripted remarks blaming Netanyahu for the continued crisis. In some cases, videos of living hostages were quickly followed by horrific images of the same hostages murdered shortly after the recordings were published. The videos represented a cruel form of psychological manipulation and even torture of the entire Israeli society.
The psychological warfare played directly into the hands of the Hostages and Missing Families Forum, which has been relentlessly blaming Netanyahu for the crisis since Oct. 7, 2023.
‘Bring them home’
Many of the organizers of the forum were also the organizers of anti-Netanyahu protests during a series of five consecutive elections in the past six years, and the organizers of the massive protests against Netanyahu’s judicial reform program. Even the slogan “Bring Them Home” was designed as an alternative to “Let Them Go,” to put the burden of returning the hostages on Netanyahu, instead of on the Hamas hostage-takers.
Sadly, over the next six weeks, Hamas may have many opportunities to continue this manipulative strategy. Even in the hours before the first release, Hamas was refusing to release the names of the first three hostages to come home, as Israel intensified last-minute airstrikes before the ceasefire went into effect. Few Israelis are naïve enough to believe that the release of the rest of the 33 hostages will go smoothly.
Are Israelis celebrating?
According to polls published since the deal was announced, a majority of Israelis support it. (It should be noted that polls in Israel are often carefully manufactured to get the results desired by those commissioning them.) Polls indicate that about 90% of voters who supported the opposition in the last election, and about half of voters who supported parties in the coalition, support the hostage deal. In part, their support stems from being conditioned to believe that negotiating with the terrorists is the only way to get the captives home.
Additionally, after 15 months with loved ones, friends and colleagues enlisted in continuous military service and fighting on multiple fronts, Israelis are tired of war. And Israelis have been conditioned over years of conflicts to believe that “total victory,” as Netanyahu touted earlier in the war, is not actually attainable even if it may well be within grasp.
Yet even with public acquiescence to a deal, both those who have been pressuring Israel to get its hostages back at any cost, as well as those who believe the war aims of removing Hamas as a military and political force are more important than returning the hostages, are rightly complaining about the terms of the agreement.
Ben-Gvir’s resignation
The right flank of Netanyahu’s coalition, the six-member Otzma Yehudit Party led by firebrand National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, has resigned in protest of the deal, calling it a “capitulation to terror.” The resignations still leave Netanyahu’s governing coalition with a slim majority. Further, a significant portion of the Israeli public has come to view Ben-Gvir’s ideology, when combined with his relentless political threats, as extreme, even if many hold similar ideological views.
Netanyahu’s stubborn refusal to give in to Biden administration demands to stop fighting at many earlier stages in the war can be at least partially attributed to Ben-Gvir’s threats to leave the government. Had Israel caved in at earlier stages, it may not have accomplished many of the war’s greatest gains, including entering Rafah, taking the Philadelphi Corridor, launching ground operations in Lebanon, and assassinating Hamas and Hezbollah terror leaders in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and even Tehran.
Once Netanyahu shored up his coalition with the addition of newly appointed Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s New Hope Party, Ben-Gvir’s ultimatums no longer threatened Netanyahu’s ruling majority. Ben-Gvir has offered to return to the government should Israel resume its offensive against Hamas. But even if the IDF resumes operations in Gaza, Netanyahu is unlikely to invite Ben-Gvir to return.
Will Netanyahu survive politically?
At the same time, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who, similar to Ben-Gvir sits to the right of Netanyahu, has opted to remain in the government for the time being. Yet, he has threatened to bolt, along with his Religious Zionism Party, from Netanyahu’s coalition if Israel does not return to fighting in Gaza at the end of phase 1.
Should Smotrich follow Ben-Gvir into the opposition, Netanyahu would lose his majority in the Knesset. What was once viewed as a stable right-wing coalition is being heavily tested by this agreement and its aftermath, leaving Netanyahu to choose between appeasing the incoming American administration, satisfying the demands of those who want the hostages home at any cost, and his own ability to remain in power.
Many have been calling for Netanyahu’s ouster since Oct. 7, 2023, and many more believe that sooner or later, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister will be forced to resign over the major security lapse that led to the deaths of some 1,200 and the ongoing hostage crisis. Yet Netanyahu, as usual, has remained resolute and has conducted the war and navigated its associated diplomatic and political challenges with skill many believe only he is capable of.
Most would have predicted that Netanyahu would no longer be in office. Yet, his potential challengers have all fallen by the wayside, and Israel’s seemingly indispensable man is still in control.
The embattled prime minister is facing several major domestic issues in addition to fighting the war, including public demand for the return of the hostages. These also include an agreement to force stringently religious sects to join the military while remaining in Netanyahu’s coalition, and the reintroduction of a judicial reforms package that will alter the nepotistic selection process of Supreme Court justices and allow the government to select its own attorney general.
Netanyahu hopes that bringing the hostages home—as has been demanded of him—will buy him political capital toward dealing with some of his other complex domestic challenges.
Palestinians are celebrating
Optics are certainly not everything in the Middle East. But projecting strength in the region, even when severely weakened, is a key component of maintaining public support. Hamas is claiming that the ceasefire deal is a victory for it. Some Palestinians in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Yerushalayim and elsewhere are celebrating the deal that sees a halt to Israel’s offensive in Gaza and the release of 1,700 Palestinian prisoners. The price Hamas needs to pay for halting the Israeli military campaign is only 33 Israelis—some of whom are dead.
This was the Hamas strategy from the beginning: Kidnap as many Israelis as possible, dead or alive. Use them as trade bait, along with an international pressure campaign, to stop the IDF in its tracks. While the IDF inflicted much more damage in Gaza than at any other point in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and certainly more than at any point since the ill-fated Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian-majority enclave in 2005, the Hamas strategy appears to have worked as planned.
With phase 1 of the deal, Hamas retains political control of Gaza, and continues to place its hands all over the so-called humanitarian aid entering the Strip. And in the weeks leading up to the agreement, Hamas was reorganizing as a heavily damaged but not destroyed fighting force.
Hamas is still alive and seemingly still in control of Gaza, and it is doing its best to give the impression of a victory.
Not everyone buying the spin
And while many Palestinians, left without much other sources of hope, will buy the propaganda that somehow Hamas has won, there are just as many who reject the spin. First, they can see with their own eyes just how much damage Israel has caused to Gaza following the unprovoked Oct. 7 massacre. The damage and death tolls caused by Israel are greater than the damage Hamas caused by orders of magnitude. Tens of thousands have been killed. Hundreds of thousands of Gazans remain displaced, living in tents instead of the nice houses they once occupied.
Much of the Palestinian manipulation machine has come into focus, both during the IDF campaign, and now in the ceasefire deal. While before the war, Gaza was referred to as an “open air prison,” it is now also referred to as the Mediterranean paradise that Israel destroyed. And while Israel was accused of committing “genocide” during its military campaign, now Hamas claims it has defeated the IDF. For Palestinian propaganda artists, apparently you can have your poison cake and eat it too.
The value of an Israeli life
And while many surmise that Gazans are getting the upper hand with this deal, others can clearly see the value that Israel places on the lives of its citizens, including hostages and soldiers. Palestinians can see how little their leadership values their lives, using Gazans as human shields, using elevated death tolls as a strategy in forcing international pressure on Israel. By contrast, Israel is willing to trade hundreds of hardened criminals to get back a handful of hostages. It is a powerful message of light triumphing over darkness.
And while Israel is releasing 1,000 prisoners of war, plus an additional 700 plus terrorists, the totals can also be framed in the context of the total number of Hamas terrorists Israel has killed—believed to be well over 15,000. Even with the return of 1,700 terrorists, the numbers remain staggeringly in Israel’s favor.
Another unfortunate consideration is the difficulty Israel has in maintaining such large numbers of Palestinian prisoners in its penitentiary system, from a cost, infrastructure and manpower perspective.
A Day 1 victory for Trump
Incoming President Trump has been adamant in his pledge to end the wars between Russia and Ukraine, and the war between Israel and Iran, along with its network of terror proxies including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.
While Trump warned that there would be “hell to pay” for Hamas if it did not release the hostages by the time he was inaugurated, his envoy Steve Witkoff put significant pressure on Netanyahu to ensure that his new boss would get the international diplomatic victory he wanted from Day 1.
Striking Iran; Saudi normalization
Netanyahu has much to gain from a Trump presidency. In an interview I conducted with the prime minister ahead of the most recent Knesset election, Netanyahu insisted that there were two accomplishments he would seek in his current term: ensuring Iran never crossed the threshold of developing a nuclear weapon, and expanding the regional circle of peace including normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia.
Neither of those two goals proved achievable alongside the Biden administration. Trump, in his first term, pulled out of the disastrous JCPOA Iran nuclear deal, and he has repeatedly spoken about how dangerous a nuclear Iran would be for global stability. When asked whether Israel should strike nuclear facilities in retaliation for a barrage of 200 ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel in April, Trump said that Israel should strike the nuclear facilities first and foremost.
Yet at present, it is not clear that Israel has the military capabilities to attack facilities buried deep under Iranian mountains. The United States can provide Israel with bunker-busting capabilities to attack the sites on its own, or potentially join in a military strike.
Similarly, as the broker of the original Abraham Accords agreements, Trump insisted that there were as many as five or more countries willing to sign normalization agreements with Israel—including Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration did not possess the acumen to get a deal done, which would have included placing full political backing behind Israel while properly incentivizing Muslim-majority nations to enter into agreements with the Jewish state.
Bibi wants Trump. Does Trump want Bibi?
Netanyahu is hopeful that Trump will help Israel on both fronts. The prime minister believes that this combination has the potential to transform the Middle East for decades to come. For Netanyahu to get Trump’s full backing and the resumption of the flow of critical weapons for Israel to conduct the current as well as future potential wars, Netanyahu contended that it may be best to accept a seemingly bad hostage deal.
While Netanyahu clearly prefers Trump over what might have been a disastrous administration led by outgoing Vice President Kamala Harris, Trump may not be limited to such black and white options concerning potential Israeli leaders.
Netanyahu has a long record of standing up to American presidents when he felt it was in Israel’s best interests. Trump for his part recognizes that a new Israeli prime minister would have little choice but to play nicely with the incoming president. And as Netanyahu’s future success depends on Trump, agreeing to a temporary ceasefire on one front of a larger war may have advantages over making Trump believe that he was difficult to work with.
A pro-Israel dream team?
Under Trump will be an administration that promises to be one of the most pro-Israel in the history of America. During his confirmation hearing, incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio asked regarding Israel, “How can any nation … coexist side-by-side with a group of savages like Hamas?” Incoming Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said in his hearing, “I support Israel killing every last member of Hamas.”
In an interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said that “Hamas will never govern Gaza. That is completely unacceptable.” He added that he wants Israelis “to hear me loud and clear” that “if Hamas reneges on this deal and Hamas backs out, moves the goalpost, what have you, we will support Israel in doing what it has to do.”
Together with incoming U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, a longtime supporter of the Jewish state, the new administration looks like a pro-Israel dream team. The appointments likely led Hamas to recognize it had better agree to a hostage-release deal.
These statements from the incoming administration are fundamentally different from the types of nuanced and unproductive messaging led by outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who all stated that “while they support Israel’s right to self-defense, how Israel conducts its operations matters.”
In an exit interview with The New York Times, Blinken recently acknowledged that perceived pressure on Israel led Hamas to harden its demands in negotiations.
Wildcard Witkoff
While virtually no one questions the pro-Israel bona fides of Rubio, Hegseth, Waltz and Huckabee, many in Israel are beginning to question the loyalties of Trump’s Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff. Witkoff undoubtedly placed tremendous pressure on Netanyahu to reach a ceasefire deal ahead of the inauguration, just as it seemed that Israel’s negotiating power would have gotten much stronger had it waited until Trump was back in the White House.
Many around Netanyahu are suspicious of Witkoff’s connections to Doha, after the Qatar Investment Authority sovereign wealth fund purchased the distressed Park Land Hotel in Manhattan from a Witkoff-led company for $623 million in 2023. Witkoff told Fox News‘s Sean Hannity last week that the Qataris, who have housed Hamas leaders for decades and funneled billions to the Gaza Strip, were doing “God’s work” in negotiating the hostage release-ceasefire deal.
Witkoff fills the role once held by Jason Greenblatt, a strong Trump-appointed Israel-backer. Israelis remember bad hires during the first Trump administration, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who was later fired and replaced by major Israel -supporter Mike Pompeo. Perhaps Witkoff will experience the same fate as Tillerson. Otherwise, he may be a force Netanyahu needs to contend with over the next four years. Witkoff will now have his work cut out if he wishes to prove to Israelis he is on their side.
Major strategic questions
Now that the ceasefire deal is signed, several major strategic questions remain. The first is whether the war is grinding to halt, or merely seeing a pause in the action. Will Hamas deliver all the hostages without further manipulations? Will Hamas be willing to release all of the remaining hostages in phase 2 or 3, and can such phases be successfully negotiated.
Did Netanyahu agree to the deal in exchange for guarantees on the flow of American weapons to Israel, or American guarantees on Iran? Will Israel continue the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon? Will Israel and the United States team up to tackle the Houthis, who continue to fire ballistic missiles at Israel and interrupt international shipping by blocking the Bab el-Mandeb strait that leads to the Suez Canal?
Will Hamas be the governing force in Gaza following the implementation of this deal? And if Hamas is not in charge, who will be? Will Israel setup a provisional military government to rule the Strip, to ensure that humanitarian aid is not hijacked by terrorists and that any and all rebuilding efforts are tied to a process of deradicalization?
Will Israel permanently take land in part or all of the Gaza Strip, or in Southern Lebanon and southern Syria, to permanently shame the terror groups that attacked it and deter future attacks?
And will Gazan civilians finally be afforded the basic human right of leaving the Strip if they so wish, to restart their lives elsewhere, after their homes and entire neighborhoods have been destroyed?
The answers to the above questions will determine whether or not this bad hostage deal was a deal worth making. JNS
{Matzav.com}