Though the IDF continues to make strides in its battle against Hamas across multiple areas, military officials admitted to The Jerusalem Post on Wednesday that fully dismantling the terror group could take a year—or possibly several.
The conversation began with mention of the IDF’s recent achievement in eliminating 300 Hamas operatives, and a cumulative total of between 18,000 and 20,000 killed before the January 19 ceasefire. However, those numbers must be considered alongside estimates that Hamas still has over 25,000 fighters, and that the IDF’s current main effort is centered on clearing out the group’s remaining forces in Rafah.
In essence, although the IDF has wiped out a significant portion of Hamas’s fighters and few remain from the estimated 4,000 to 8,000 that were originally based in Rafah, the largest remaining concentrations consist of only several hundred. Going up against a network that might still have 25,000 members scattered across Gaza makes the goal of total elimination a daunting and time-intensive task.
While there are hopes among some in Israel that Hamas might collapse soon and that its leadership might agree to go into exile, if that does not occur—and if no permanent ceasefire is brokered involving moderate Sunni allies to reconstruct Gaza—then the conflict risks dragging into a prolonged, grinding campaign.
Some military leaders accept this possibility and predict that the war effort could extend over several years, involving the meticulous unearthing and destruction of isolated terror cells that have taken refuge in civilian sites like schools.
Elements of the IDF’s recent briefings about its gains in Rafah have also raised eyebrows.
During Jerusalem Post visits to Rafah in June, August, and September 2024, and based on multiple briefings and official statements at the time, it was asserted that Hamas’s Rafah-based units had been decisively beaten.
Officials were particularly confident that forces stationed in the Shaboura sector had been entirely dismantled.
Yet IDF representatives now reveal that key Hamas battalions remained embedded in Shaboura, contradicting the earlier narrative. They explained this by noting that the IDF had not yet conducted a full-scale incursion into that area.
Pressed on this inconsistency, IDF spokespeople suggested that prior comments may have referred solely to the Shaboura refugee camp—a smaller subsection—while the broader Shaboura zone had not been fully penetrated.
This kind of caveat was missing from previous statements by the IDF and other senior officials. The more recent clarifications, however, may offer a more honest and precise account, implying that the earlier descriptions of victory were overstated.
Another noticeable shift has been the tone adopted by current IDF commanders.
Whereas under former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and ex-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, some IDF figures occasionally expressed views diverging from Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu’s positions, the military leadership now appears more aligned with the political leadership’s messaging.
Previously, officials under Halevi and Gallant acknowledged that applying military pressure might help secure the release of hostages, but they also warned that such pressure could backfire—potentially endangering hostages if they were mistakenly targeted during an assault on what was believed to be a safe zone.
At present, there appears to be near-unanimity among IDF officials that increasing military pressure will yield only positive results in terms of rescuing captives.
Defense Minister Yisroel Katz, speaking to The Jerusalem Post on Wednesday, strongly emphasized the necessity of retaining control over the Philadelphi Corridor.
Katz revealed that newly discovered smuggling tunnels running between Gaza and Egypt had come to light, warning that without an IDF presence in the corridor, Hamas could initiate a large-scale effort to restock its weapons.
This statement marks a stark contrast to what top IDF officials said during a September 2024 tour of the corridor. At that time, they claimed there were no more than ten tunnels, all of which had been sealed. They also asserted that Hamas had not been using them to bring in fresh weapons during the war, but only for moving existing munitions within Gaza.
Instead, senior officers stated that most of Hamas’s arsenal had been brought into the Strip long ago, primarily through the Rafah crossing when Egypt’s inspections were lax and failed to prevent smuggling above ground.
{Matzav.com Israel}