The Shin Bet (ISA) revealed the findings of its investigation into the events of October 7, detailing significant failures that contributed to the organization’s inability to foresee and prevent the Hamas assault, which resulted in a massacre.
The investigation uncovered that the Shin Bet did not identify the Hamas attack as a widespread and large-scale threat until it began. Intelligence gathered in advance was not properly analyzed, and warning signs of the imminent attack were not given the attention they deserved.
The Shin Bet outlined several key reasons for its failure:

• Inefficient handling of intelligence – Hamas’ “Jericho Wall” plan, which was detected in both 2018 and 2022, was not deemed a credible threat.
• Lack of clear responsibility-sharing with the IDF – the Shin Bet did not recognize its duty to warn of a major military assault.
• Focus on counterterrorism rather than military threats – the Shin Bet concentrated on preventing terrorist acts instead of preparing for a large-scale military attack.
• Inadequate intelligence analysis during the night of October 6-7 – early signs of the attack were not analyzed appropriately.
• Shortcomings in the control mechanisms – external evaluations were not carried out, which could have potentially uncovered these flaws.
• Overconfidence in the Gaza border barrier – the Shin Bet believed the IDF was well-prepared and failed to predict the collapse of the defense system.
• Overemphasis on Judea and Samaria – the Shin Bet misjudged Hamas’ intentions, thinking the group would target Judea and Samaria rather than launching a major attack from Gaza.

The investigation also cited several factors that likely prompted Hamas to launch its offensive, including the mounting tensions over the Temple Mount, the treatment of security prisoners (with a nod to former Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s policies), and the perception of Israeli society being weakened due to the internal disputes over judicial reform.
The reason Hamas was able to strengthen its military capabilities without interference is also addressed in the investigation. It points to Israeli policy failures, such as the “silence for money” arrangement, which saw the flow of Qatari funds to Hamas, allowing the group to bolster its military strength.
Furthermore, Israeli deterrence collapsed as Hamas understood that Israel would not take preemptive action. The IDF and Shin Bet also avoided executing substantial strikes, enabling Hamas to prepare unchallenged for its attacks.
Did the Shin Bet have any warning before the attack began? At approximately 01:00 on October 7, the Shin Bet released an intelligence report that suggested Hamas was not planning an escalation. The report noted, “A series of signs that, in terms of severity, indicate that Hamas is preparing for an emergency. Alongside the aforementioned, there are indications of routine on the ground as well as maintaining restraint, with the ‘agreement of understanding’ having begun in the background and it is estimated that Hamas is not interested in an escalation and launching a military campaign at this time.”
At 03:03, a general alert was issued about unusual Hamas activity, though it was not interpreted as the preparation for a large-scale attack. By 04:30, 45 “SIMs” (Hamas communication networks) were activated, but the event was not recognized as the beginning of an attack, since similar SIMs had been used the year prior. An emergency meeting held at 04:30 raised concerns about a potential small-scale kidnapping attempt but did not assess a large-scale assault.
The Shin Bet further mentioned that a team of soldiers was sent to the southern region to prepare for possible infiltration points into Israel, responding to the potential threat of an infiltration or kidnapping.
Intelligence gathering was hindered by limitations in the Gaza Strip, which became a closed-off area, reducing the ability to disrupt enemy detection mechanisms. Despite this, the investigation highlights that the intelligence gathered from hundreds of operations over recent years could have painted a clearer picture if utilized properly during the night.
Additionally, the investigation revealed gaps in the recruitment and use of human agents, exacerbated by the restrictions on operating within Gaza. The Shin Bet pointed out a significant operation in Khan Yunis in 2018 that exposed a weakness in its human intelligence network, which contributed to this challenge.
Another critical issue was the failure to create alternative assessments and thoroughly consider competing hypotheses. The Shin Bet’s leading assumption that Hamas would focus on causing unrest in Judea and Samaria was not adequately questioned, preventing a more thorough evaluation of the possibility of a large-scale military attack from Gaza.
The Shin Bet also acknowledged that its research division had forewarned about a lack of deterrence that could embolden Israel’s adversaries, including Hamas.
When the attack finally commenced, the Shin Bet responded swiftly. It established special operational units to manage the hostage crisis, locate missing individuals, and thwart Hamas raiding squads. It also interrogated captured Hamas operatives, yielding vital information for Israeli forces. Coordinated operations with the IDF helped locate terrorist cells that had returned to Gaza after the attack, while forces were deployed to various regions, including the north, to prepare for potential Hezbollah involvement.
To prevent similar failures in the future, the Shin Bet is implementing broad reforms. It is creating an “online” intelligence control unit to enable real-time analysis, upgrading its research division to enhance intelligence assessments, and establishing a “terrorist financing” unit to address Hamas’ funding. Additionally, it is reorganizing intelligence units in Gaza to improve human intelligence and refining the division of responsibilities with the IDF to ensure clearer communication regarding warning signs of potential conflicts.
In conclusion, the Shin Bet admitted that it failed to foresee the Hamas attack, attributing the failure to a series of incorrect professional and management decisions. The agency has committed to addressing these shortcomings to avoid similar future disasters. The findings have been presented to the Prime Minister, with further discussions anticipated in the government.
{Matzav.com Israel}