The Israel Defense Forces detected preparations for Hamas rocket fire and other “unusual activity” in the Gaza Strip on the eve of the Oct. 7, 2023 cross-border massacre but decided not to raise the alert level, according to intelligence documents cited by Ynet on Thursday.
The decision not to brace for a possible assault was made by “wide consensus” across the Military Intelligence Directorate and the broader army, according to the report. This was part of an attempt to avoid burning sources, amid other “calming indications” suggesting that Hamas was merely preparing an exercise.
The information was reportedly included in official records seen by top government and security officials and presented in their arguments in favor of the resignation of IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi.
Halevi announced his resignation on Tuesday, citing his “responsibility for the IDF’s failure” during the Hamas-led Oct. 7 massacre, in which Gaza terrorists murdered some 1,200 people and took 251 hostages.
At 2 a.m. on Oct. 7, the Israeli Air Force command center was informed of unusual activity in the Hamas aerial units, according to Ynet. At the same time, additional indications of preparations for rocket launches were reported.
The alarming signs were reportedly discussed in a phone conversation that included OC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and senior IDF officers, as well as representatives of the air force and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet). The chief of Military Intelligence and the head of the IAF, Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, did not participate, according to the report.
OC Operations Directorate Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk was updated on the call and ordered some action to be taken.
“After consulting with the deputy head of Shin Bet, the commander of Southern Command, the operations commander and the intelligence research department chief, there are three possible scenarios,” Basyuk wrote according to files obtained by the Hebrew outlet.
The three scenarios he outlined according to the report were a Hamas drill, preparations by the terrorist group to defend against an IDF assault, or preparations “for an operation against Israel in the coming hours, including incursion from the sea or a strike on the gas rig, breaching the border, abduction, shooting attack, rocket attack or an aerial incursion.”
Basyuk reportedly ordered a review of Israel’s aerial defenses around the gas rig, but concluded that “there must be careful preparation to protect sensitive sources and coordinate actions with Military Intelligence.”
Halevi was said to have held consultations with Basyuk and Finkelman at 4 a.m., after which he ordered an aerial surveillance mission, arguing that even if Hamas was conducting a drill, it would be an opportunity to gather intel.
The chief of staff scheduled a meeting with some senior commanders at 8:30 a.m. “barring significant developments,” according to Ynet.
Around 6:30 a.m., air-raid sirens were activated warning of significant rocket fire from Gaza, followed by a ground assault led by some 3,800 terrorists of Hamas’s Nukhba forces, who headed the invasion, as well as 2,200 other terrorists and looters from the coastal enclave.
The IDF’s Spokesperson’s Unit told Ynet that the files it had obtained were not part of the official probe into the Oct. 7 failure, which is ongoing.
“The IDF will complete its inquiries into the Oct. 7 massacre in the coming weeks and will present its findings to the public,” it said.
In January 2024, Israel’s Walla news outlet cited military sources as claiming that while the IDF was aware of Hamas’s repeated attempts to blow up the security fence on the Gaza border in preparation for the Oct. 7 attacks, it opted to dismiss the rehearsals as a “provocation.”
An intelligence document compiled by the Gaza Division some three weeks before Oct. 7 warned that the Iranian-backed terror group was preparing for an attack in which at least 200 captives would be taken.
It was revealed in February that hours before Hamas launched its attack, IDF intelligence learned that hundreds of terrorists in Gaza had activated Israeli SIM cards in their phones.
The activations were detected around midnight on the night of Oct. 6, six and a half hours before terrorists breached the border fence.
In October, The New York Times reported that Unit 8200, the military’s elite signals intelligence unit, stopped listening to Hamas’s handheld radios a year before the attacks, deciding it was a “waste of effort.” JNS
{Matzav.com Israel}