On Thursday, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) shared new footage and details about one of its most intricate and high-risk commando operations, in which 120 special forces troops successfully infiltrated an underground Iranian missile production facility deep within Syria in September.
At the time of the operation, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime remained in control, and Israel had not yet launched its offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Some aspects of the operation, previously disclosed by international media, have since been corrected or clarified, including details about the raid’s name.
The operation, which was referred to internally by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as “Operation Many Ways,” aimed to dismantle an underground missile production facility used by Iranian forces. The facility was designed to produce precision-guided missiles for both Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria.
The site, known as “Deep Layer” by the military, was carved into a mountain at the Scientific Studies and Research Center (CERS), located near Masyaf, Syria, west of Hama. This facility sat more than 200 kilometers from Israel’s border and about 45 kilometers from Syria’s western coastline.
The IDF described the site as Iran’s “flagship project” to arm Hezbollah.
The operation was carried out flawlessly by the IAF’s elite Shaldag unit in cooperation with the Unit 669 search and rescue team, with no casualties among the Israeli soldiers.
The raid was disclosed shortly after the collapse of the Assad regime, which had long been aligned with Iran. Under Assad, Syria served as a conduit for Iran to manufacture and deliver weapons to Hezbollah, though Iranian forces have since exited Syria following the loss of their key Syrian ally.
Iran’s efforts to build the “Deep Layer” facility began in 2017 after an Israeli airstrike took out an aboveground rocket engine facility at CERS. This original site had been supplying Hezbollah with rockets, many of which were later launched at northern Israel during the October 8, 2023, attack following the Hamas invasion.
The destruction of the aboveground facility and other Israeli strikes in Syria targeting arms shipments to Hezbollah forced Iran to reconsider its approach. The result was the construction of a new, underground facility, designed to be more resilient against Israeli airstrikes.
The new facility was built 70-130 meters below ground, making it nearly invulnerable to aerial bombardment.
Construction on the facility began in late 2017, and the IDF had intelligence on the site from the very beginning of its construction.
By 2021, the facility was completed, and work began to equip it with the necessary machinery for missile production. Over the next several years, the facility continued to receive equipment and conducted tests on its production lines.
The structure was designed in a horseshoe shape, with one entrance for raw materials, another for finished missiles, and a third for logistics and access to office spaces. The office area was connected to the manufacturing space.
Inside the facility, there were at least 16 rooms dedicated to missile production, including spaces for mixing rocket fuel, constructing missile bodies, and painting the finished missiles.
Although the facility was not fully operational when the IDF conducted the raid, it was close to being declared functional. Two missiles had been successfully produced during testing, and mass production of rocket engines was already underway.
The IDF assessed that the facility was intended to produce between 100 and 300 missiles annually, including long-range missiles with up to 300 kilometers of range, precision-guided missiles with up to 130 kilometers, and short-range rockets with ranges between 40 and 70 kilometers.
The facility, located near Lebanon’s border, was meant to replace Iran’s previous method of transporting missiles and parts through Syria into Lebanon, a strategy that had been repeatedly disrupted by Israeli airstrikes over the years.
While the idea of raiding the facility had been under consideration for years, it wasn’t until the escalation of the current war that Israeli leaders began to take serious action.
The Shaldag unit was chosen for the mission due to its expertise, and the IAF determined it would be more efficient for its special forces to conduct the raid rather than use ground forces or Navy commandos.
Two months before the raid, the Shaldag unit and Unit 669 began rigorous training to prepare for various contingencies and scenarios.
This training took place concurrently with Israel’s campaign against Hamas in Gaza and ongoing operations in Lebanon, as well as defending against daily rocket and drone attacks from Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups.
The training was considered risky because of the resources it consumed amid the broader conflict, and if the raid had failed, it would have been seen as a waste of time and effort.
In the weeks leading up to the operation, the IDF intensified its intelligence-gathering efforts to map out the facility’s layout, identify potential threats, and plan the logistics of the mission, including dealing with Syrian air defense systems and ground forces.
September 8 was chosen for the raid due to favorable weather conditions for the IAF’s helicopters.
That evening, 100 Shaldag commandos and 20 members of Unit 669 boarded four CH-53 “Yasur” helicopters at an Israeli airbase and flew toward Syria.
They were accompanied by two attack helicopters for close air support, 21 fighter jets, five drones, and 14 spy planes, with 30 more aircraft on standby in Israel.
The helicopters traveled over the Mediterranean Sea, bypassing Lebanese airspace before entering Syria, staying low to avoid detection by Syrian radar systems.
The Masyaf region, known for its high concentration of air defense systems, posed significant challenges. However, several of these defenses had been destroyed in previous IAF strikes and were not operational by the time of the raid.
Adding to the complexity of the mission, Russian forces stationed along the Syrian coast maintained their own air defense systems.
The journey from the coast to the target site took just 18 minutes, during which the helicopters remained undetected. Simultaneously, IAF fighter jets and drones, along with Navy missile boats, launched airstrikes targeting the CERS facility and other locations in Syria. These strikes served to obscure the helicopters’ approach and confuse Syrian forces into thinking it was a routine Israeli attack.
Some of the airstrikes were also meant to draw Syrian forces away from the facility, although some soldiers were seen approaching the site as the raid progressed.
The first of the helicopters landed near the entrance of the facility, deploying several Shaldag commandos, while two others landed at different positions in the area. A fourth helicopter held position before landing to drop off additional troops.
After completing the drop-off, the helicopters moved to other positions and waited for more than two hours while the commandos completed their mission.
Unit 669 remained on standby in the helicopters, ready to assist with medical treatment if needed but committed to staying until the mission was complete.
On the ground, the first team of commandos secured the area, while a second team advanced to the facility’s entrance, neutralizing two guards. A third team set up on a nearby hill, using a drone to monitor the situation and eliminate any threats.
At night, Syrian soldiers usually locked the facility’s entrances and guarded the perimeter. However, fewer guards were present during this operation, and the IDF stated that the facility was not yet operational, meaning no personnel were inside when the raid occurred.
One of the major obstacles the commandos faced was breaching the heavy-duty doors at the entrance to the underground facility. According to those involved, this task was particularly challenging.
After 50 minutes, the first team succeeded in breaking through one of the entrances, which was used for logistics and office access. They proceeded to open the remaining doors with forklifts, which had been pre-identified by the IDF as equipment available at the facility. Some commandos had been specially trained to operate forklifts for this purpose.
Meanwhile, another team set up explosives at key points in the facility, including on the rocket production line. A quad bike was also brought in to facilitate rapid movement inside the facility.
Fifty commandos rigged the production line with explosives, while the other 50 maintained security outside and engaged any threats.
Fighter jets continued to strike surrounding areas to prevent Syrian soldiers from approaching, while IAF aircraft deployed 49 munitions during the raid.
Once the explosives were planted, the commandos evacuated to their initial landing zones. The helicopters returned to pick them up after two and a half hours on the ground.
As the commandos boarded, the explosives were detonated, creating a blast equivalent to one ton of explosives, shaking the area like “a mini earthquake.”
The helicopters departed, heading back toward Israel, leaving behind some equipment, including the quad bike.
Syrian soldiers reached the facility about an hour after the Israeli forces had left, underscoring the operation’s time sensitivity.
The IDF estimated that around 30 Syrian guards and soldiers were killed during the operation, while Syrian media reported 14 dead and 43 injured.
The IDF also captured intelligence documents that corroborated its assessment that the facility was nearing operational status.
Currently, the IDF reports that the underground facility is no longer active, and Iranian forces have withdrawn from Syria following the fall of Assad’s regime.
{Matzav.com Israel}