A military investigation released Sunday concluded that serious operational failures—including poor coordination, miscommunication, and delayed deployment—contributed to the IDF’s inability to prevent a deadly Hamas assault on the southern city of Ofakim during the October 7 attacks. The probe, led by Brig. Gen. Oren Simcha, found that 15 Hamas terrorists infiltrated Ofakim around 6:40 a.m., killing 33 people—25 civilians and 8 security personnel—within the first 40 minutes. IDF troops arrived too late to affect the outcome of the battle, the report said. One of the closest military units, from the Chaim Laskov Officers Training School (Bahad 1), was mistakenly dispatched to the wrong location. Soldiers were forced to proceed on foot for more than 30 minutes to reach the combat zone, by which time the terrorists had either been killed or barricaded themselves inside homes. “This was a battle that could have ended in hundreds of deaths,” a senior IDF official involved in the probe said. “It was the determination of police officers, civilians, and local soldiers that stopped the massacre.” The investigation cited a breakdown in coordination between the IDF, police, and local authorities. At the time of the attack, Ofakim had no operational emergency command center, no standby defense squad, and no real-time intelligence to guide responders. Civilian reports painted a chaotic and inaccurate picture of an entire city overrun, when the assault was in fact limited to three streets in the Mishor HaGeffen neighborhood. Military forces from Bahad 1 only reached Ofakim’s industrial zone around 9:10 a.m.—more than two hours after the attack began—and had to walk to the scene. “By the time they arrived, the battle had effectively ended,” a military source told reporters. “The terrorists were either neutralized or entrenched. The soldiers were no longer relevant to the fight.” Of the five IDF platoons deployed, only two were eventually reassigned to assist in nearby Kibbutz Kisufim. The remaining three stayed in Ofakim. The report also noted the tactical planning by Hamas operatives, who specifically targeted Mishor HaGeffen due to its lack of fortified rooms. Maps seized after the attack labeled the neighborhood as a “protection-free zone,” suggesting Hamas anticipated civilians would flee to public shelters, leaving them exposed. In response to the attack, Ofakim has since established a functioning municipal command hub, deployed armed response units, and integrated surveillance systems. The report also highlighted a rare success: the rescue of hostages Rachel and David Edri by Yamam, Israel’s elite counterterrorism unit. According to Deputy Commander Superintendent L., the October 7 rescue marked the first time in Yamam’s history that hostages were extracted from a private residence during an ongoing urban assault. The raid, which followed 14 hours of planning and lasted only two minutes, resulted in the deaths of four terrorists and the safe recovery of the hostages. Three Yamam officers were wounded, including one seriously. All later returned to duty. Superintendent L. paid tribute to First Sgt. Yitav Lev Halevi, one of the first operatives to enter the home. Halevi was later killed during a separate counterterrorism mission in the West Bank. “He was a principled warrior and an extraordinary human being,” L. said. “I wanted you to know his name.” (YWN World Headquarters – NYC)