She introduced herself as “Anna Elena,” supposedly a Canadian citizen engaged in road safety advocacy in the United Kingdom. She reached out asking for assistance with her “life-saving work in Israel.” But, as revealed by Israel’s Shin Bet security service, she was actually working for Iranian intelligence. Her initial instructions seemed harmless—putting up posters—but they gradually turned into more dangerous assignments, including digging up a planted phone, paying others to carry out tasks, and even proposing acts of violence and sabotage.
Ynet reports that at the time of first contact, the 22-year-old man lived what appeared to be an ordinary life. He was studying in yeshiva, preparing for a future as a Sofer Stam. He was also struggling with about 70,000 shekels of debt, which he blamed on poor financial choices.
During his questioning by the Shin Bet, a clearer picture emerged—one of someone who may have been unaware of the full extent of what he was involved in but still realized he had gone too far. He admitted to experiencing worry, guilt, and uncertainty throughout his involvement.
Late at night on June 27, 2024, during an interrogation with an officer using the alias “Uzi,” S. confessed that he had been speaking with someone named Anna Elena through Telegram. He laid out what he had been asked to do and how he responded.
At first, he used his regular mobile phone to chat with Anna Elena, but he was later directed to switch to a new device specifically for their conversations. S. asked a man named Jonathan to pick up this replacement phone from Haifa. Even after receiving it, S. continued using his main phone due to difficulty operating the new one.
In fact, Ynet reports, when the Shin Bet arrested S. that very night, he was unusually quick to talk. He was questioned between 2:50 and 4:05 a.m. at his home in Beit Shemesh and seemed almost relieved to finally speak. The investigator mentioned that S. appeared to know why they had come. “I think I know what this is about, it’s connected to the phone I handed over to the police a few minutes ago (at the time of the arrest) and to things I’ve done recently. It all started with a Telegram profile about a month ago (in reality, even earlier).”
During this initial session, S. shared with “Uzi” a detailed account of his conversations and instructions received from Anna Elena. He described both the assignments he completed and those he had declined.
S. explained that he first interacted with the profile through Telegram on his personal device. But after the first few tasks, Anna Elena told him to retrieve a separate phone to continue communicating.
He contacted Jonathan, who lived near Yerushalayim, and asked him to collect the phone in Haifa and bring it to him. Even with the new device in hand, S. continued using his own phone due to technical difficulties with the replacement.

This wasn’t the only instance where S. recruited others. In addition to Jonathan, he worked with someone named Nathaniel, whom he paid to perform tasks. On one occasion, Jonathan was sent to hide $450 at two Tel Aviv sites, while Nathaniel was directed to hide money in 25 places across Tel Aviv and Yerushalayim.
During that late-night session, the investigator wrote that S. described receiving a graphic image of bloodied hands, which he then printed and had Jonathan post around Tel Aviv. Jonathan was paid several hundred shekels for the job.

Additional assignments included instructions to burn a forest, leave a severed sheep’s head outside the home of Israel’s ambassador to the IAEA, and prepare a doll with a knife concealed inside a box. While S. carried out some instructions, he turned down others, such as the arson and shooting requests.
According to “Uzi,” S. admitted he wasn’t sure who Anna Elena really was. “He speculated that she might reside in the Haifa area or abroad.”
S. was asked what the goal of these tasks was. Though Anna Elena never outright said, when he once asked if he should target cars of right-wing or left-wing individuals, she responded, “It doesn’t matter, the main goal is to sow chaos in the country.”
When S. refused to start a forest fire, Anna Elena asked if he’d be willing to shoot someone instead. “Given these examples, S. deduced that the missions were intended to harm the State of Israel and possibly had antisemitic grounds,” wrote the investigator. Afterward, the officer told him to bring his tefillin for the trip to the Petach Tikva police station. S. replied they were in the shul. “S. thanked me that despite all the commotion, his daughter remained asleep,” noted the officer. “S. blessed his wife and left his home.” On the way, they stopped at the Vizhnitz shul to retrieve his tefillin. “S. shook my hand, thanking me for my understanding.”
As daylight approached, Shin Bet agents brought S. to the Vizhnitz shul in Beit Shemesh for his tefillin and then continued to the police station.
Later that morning, S. was questioned again at the Petach Tikva police station, which also serves as a Shin Bet detention center and has often drawn criticism and protests due to the harsh conditions reported by former detainees.
A 2010 report by B’Tselem accused the facility of keeping suspects in inhumane conditions—solitary confinement, unclean environments, and physical restraints. But Shin Bet stated that S.’s case unfolded differently. Although he wasn’t allowed to speak to a lawyer initially, citing concerns over national security, he mostly cooperated with investigators, even though he occasionally struggled to remember details.
Ynet reports that S. insisted he hadn’t realized he was working for Iran, but Shin Bet said he knew exactly who was behind the messages.
During that morning’s questioning, an investigator named “Fuad” offered S. a cup of coffee and asked him to describe his background. S. said that about nine months earlier, he had surprisingly bought a smartphone—a rarity in his community—to learn about cryptocurrency. He joined various Telegram groups and even lost about 5,000 shekels to a scam.
In March, he got a short message from someone calling herself “Anna,” offering payment ranging from $100 to $100,000 for missions inside Israel. “I didn’t know English, so I had to translate it to understand,” S. said. “I asked her what she wanted, and Anna Elena replied by asking if I wanted to make money. She said if I did what she told me, I’d be rich, I’d have a new car and more.”
Still wary from his previous scam experience, S. questioned why she reached out to him. Anna Elena responded with a backstory: she was running a traffic safety campaign inspired by a similar effort in the UK following deadly accidents involving children. “She said she wanted to start a similar campaign in Israel and would like me to hang posters,” said S. “She offered $20 for each poster I would hang.”
He said he Googled the legality of posting public flyers and found no laws forbidding it.
Soon after, she sent him an image of a bloodied hand with English writing. It read: “It will be written in history that children were killed. Let’s stand on the right side of history.” S. said he found it unsettling but didn’t understand the words. She reassured him it was “for the sake of protecting children.”
He emailed the image to himself and visited a local shop catering to the Chareidi community, where he printed 150 copies for 150 shekels. “I arrived home with the posters, hiding them under some floor tiles near my apartment.” He then sent a picture to Anna Elena and received $50 in cryptocurrency.
This approach—starting with simple requests and escalating—matches a pattern used by Iranian operatives: building a relationship, pushing boundaries, and increasing dependence. Later, Anna Elena offered $2,600 for similar poster work in Tel Aviv.
“I didn’t want to do it myself,” S. said. “I don’t know Tel Aviv, I don’t have a car, I didn’t want my wife to find out, and as a Chareidi man, I’d attract attention hanging posters.”
Still, he wanted the payment, so he posted a vague job offer in a Telegram group. A man named Jonathan from Beitar Illit replied. “I told him I was looking for someone to hang posters in Tel Aviv and that I was willing to pay for it.” Jonathan accepted.
That evening, S. withdrew 1,800 shekels and left the supplies and payment in an attic space above his building. He messaged Jonathan the access instructions: use the elevator to the sixth floor, then climb one more flight. Later, Jonathan messaged: “Rabbi, I got the items and the money. I’m on my way.”
Despite the secrecy, Jonathan didn’t ask many questions.
“S. suspected that the message came from a hostile entity, possibly in Israel or abroad, but did not contact the police, even when he feared the phone Anna Elena had sent him might be booby-trapped. When wildfires were reported in areas Anna Elena had mentioned, S. worried there might be a connection. S. was, in practice, deeply involved and knowingly chose to continue the relationship in a way he believed was safe.”
He told Anna Elena the task would be done within an hour but didn’t admit he’d outsourced it. She shared a map marking locations throughout Tel Aviv and requested a photo every 100 meters. He relayed these details to Jonathan, who worked through the early morning hours along Ibn Gabirol Street. But complications arose—someone tore his bag, and city inspectors confronted him.
Ynet reports that Jonathan estimated he had hung 130 posters but kept 20. When Anna Elena accused S. of only completing 60 posters and threatened to dock his pay, he argued back. Eventually, he said he received about $1,500 in cryptocurrency and was told to keep the leftover posters.
Two days later, Anna Elena returned with another request—get a new phone for “family safety.” S. thought it odd but went along. She gave GPS coordinates to a buried phone in Haifa. S. again sent Jonathan to retrieve it.
Afterward, Anna Elena questioned who had picked it up. S. pretended he had gone along and waited in the car. She asked for Jonathan’s details, but he refused, worried she’d contact Jonathan directly.
By then, S. doubted her entire story. He even feared the new phone was a bomb and didn’t turn it on.
S. consulted another Telegram user about whether such a phone could be weaponized. The answer cited the Israeli assassination of Hamas terrorist Yahya Ayyash.
Nervous, S. joined a Telegram security channel run by “Abu Salah” and described his fear. He said he had received a suspicious phone and referenced the Ayyash assassination.
“Bro, what are you smoking?” Abu Salah replied. “Believe me, I don’t smoke. I’m just a regular Chareidi guy,” S. wrote back. “I just want to know if I have reason to worry… The phone might be detonated once I am identified in a crowded place.”
S. asked for contact info for a police officer but received no reply.
Despite all this, he never went to the authorities. He feared legal trouble and still wanted the money Anna Elena was providing.
Eventually, he turned on the phone, following her instructions to do so three kilometers from home. She had him install several SIM cards and create an Instagram account named “Haim.” He then stashed the device in his building’s stairwell above the sukkah beams.
Then came the most extreme request: set fire to a forest near Yerushalayim. She offered $3,000. S. refused. She doubled the offer to $7,000. He still declined.
She then proposed vandalizing a car or store window near a protest site. Again, S. said no. He told his interrogators he stalled, pretending to consider, and said he’d only continue with poster-related tasks.
But, he added, it had become clear that this wasn’t about traffic safety. “I thought maybe they were anarchists with money trying to overthrow the government.” Shin Bet, however, determined S. had long understood he was acting on behalf of an enemy of Israel.
In June 2024, as the probe advanced, Shin Bet and the police’s Lahav 433 unit arrested three Israelis for alleged collaboration with Iranian intelligence.
When questioned, S. admitted he had told Jonathan that Anna Elena asked him to start wildfires and burn vehicles.
Jonathan, who had a financial stake, reportedly told him to keep going. According to S., had Jonathan advised him to stop, he might have quit.
One Shin Bet-retrieved message showed S. texting Jonathan that what they were doing was “legal, or close enough to being legal, maybe mysterious, but legal.” Jonathan replied, “You have to understand, once you start something like this, there’s no turning back.”
In a later interrogation, S. recalled Anna Elena asking, “What will you do if I ask you to shoot someone?” She offered $75,000 and a way out of the country. S. turned her down, saying, “It didn’t suit him.”
At one point, S. began to question her story about being Canadian. He once asked what time it was where she was; she replied with the correct time in Toronto.
Shin Bet investigator: “Would you dishonor your Chassidic community for money?”S.: “No.”Investigator: “Do you care if your actions harm the State of Israel?”S.: “In this case, I feel neutral and less committed.”
Just before his arrest, Ynet reports, Anna Elena messaged him again. She suggested he and Jonathan scout a quiet forest area to begin training “like MI6 agents.” The first phase, she claimed, involved non-weaponized guerrilla tactics, which she said she’d already taught others.
He asked if this meant fighting. She said that would come later. He told her he’d check with Jonathan, but the conversation never happened.
Despite his limited tech skills, S. managed to use various apps and platforms. The investigator noted: “When I asked him if the phone he had received from Anna Elena was preloaded with apps, or he had to download them, S. said most were already installed. He had personally added Telegram, Instagram, a VPN and another messaging app with a green icon that failed to download. Later, for his personal use, he downloaded other Telegram apps, such as Telegram Plus, Telegram Premium and another app with a black X icon.”
The Shin Bet officer summed it up: “S. suspected that the message came from a hostile entity, possibly in Israel or abroad, but did not contact the police, even when he feared the phone Anna Elena had sent him might be booby-trapped.”
“After receiving reassurance from an anonymous Telegram user that the device posed no threat, he chose to continue the relationship. When wildfires were reported in areas Anna Elena had mentioned, S. worried there might be a connection. S. was, in practice, deeply involved and knowingly chose to continue the relationship in a way he believed was safe.”
Asked why he kept going, S. answered simply: “For the money.”Investigator: “Would you dishonor your Chassidic community for money?”S.: “No.”Investigator: “Do you care if your actions harm the State of Israel?”S.: “In this case, I feel neutral and less committed.”In another moment, he added: “A servant of God is always free.”
{Matzav.com Israel}